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Should

I be legally

as well as ethically

obligated to be my brother's keeper?
Should I be required, under threat of criminal
penalty, to give up my sunbathing and dive into an icy
lake to rescue a floundering

swimmer, a task I am

eminently able to accomplish? Should I be coerced by
the same legal threat to warn a lone blind man,
proceeding without a cane, that he is on the verge of
plunging off the edge of a cliff to his certain death?
Cases such as these are not notably arguable
matters in ethical terms. A person with any pretension
to human decency ought to feel compelled to proffer
assistance when he or she can do so with such little
cost. Whether the criminal law should insist on such
behavior and punish failure to so act, however, is a
different and more complicated matter.
English and American law traditionally declare
that I ought not to be burdened and bothered with the
responsibility
notes:

to aid another.

"... an able-bodied

As Peter Glazebrook

Englishman

may with

impunity watch a young child whose care he has not
undertaken drown at his feet in a foot of water. 1 The
II

operative

principle

of American

law was cold-

bloodedly set forth by the Chief Justice of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court almost a century ago:
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Suppose

A, standing

close

railroad, sees a two-year-old

by a

babe on

the track and a car approaching.

He

can easily rescue the child with entire
safety to himself. And the instincts of
humanity require him to do so. If he
does not, he may perhaps justly be
styled a ruthless savage and a moral
monster, but he is not liable in damage
for the child's injury or indictable under
the statutes for its death.2
An exception exists if the bystander has made
an initial effort to assist; then he must carry through.
He must also help those with whom he has a
preexisting relationship, such as a spouse or kin; and
those to whom he owes a contractual

duty.

This

territory of obligation has persistently been widened
by American appellate courts, but the fundamental
ground rule prevails: I am not to be legally forced to
concern myself with the woes of others, even when I
am able to do so easily.
The legal doctrine in the United States is that a
person

4

compassionate

or foolhardy

enough

to

intervene

becomes

liable

thereafter

for the

consequences; absent such intervention he remains
juridically unassailable. Take, for instance, the
Zelenko case3, in which a woman collapsed in
Gimbel Brothers department store in New York City.
She was carried to the store infIrmary and left there
unattended for six hours. When she died, her heirs
sued the store and recovered. The appellate court
noted that the store and its employees had owed the
woman "no duty at all" and "could have let her be and
die." Responsibility was assumed by the store only
because of its "meddling in matters with which legally
it had no concern."
A few statutory exceptions do exist to this
laissez-faire approach. Since 1972, Vermont has
demanded that bystanders intervene. Its criminal code
states that "a person who knows that another is
exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent
that the same can be rendered without danger of peril
to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to
the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others." Those who follow this
prescript are to be exempt from civil liability unless
their action constitutes gross negligence or unless they

anticipated being paid for what they did. Minnesota
has enacted

a similar law, while more recently,

Massachusetts decreed that persons on the site must
report crimes of violence, and Rhode Island declared
that they must notify the authorities

of crimes of

sexual assault. These last two legislative acts came in
the wake of a notorious
Bedford,

Massachusetts,

1983 episode

in

ew

in which a woman was

raped by at least four men over the course of an hour,
while bystanders failed to intervene or to notify the
authorities.
The major arguments

favoring a hands-off

approach to intervention are:
(1) Precise enunciation of a legal obligation to
rescue is a feckless endeavor.

A century ago, for

instance, Lord MaCaulay, in discussing his proposed
draft of the Indian penal code, asked whether a
medical specialist should be required under threat of
criminal liability to travel from Calcutta to Meerut if
he alone could save a dying patient, and it could be
shown that he has ample time and resources
undertake the journey.

to

Similarly, Richard Epstein

questions whether, if a strong swimmer is to be held
criminally liable for failure to make an easy rescue,
another person will be similarly liable for failure to
donate $10 to African relief when he is substantially
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certain that the money will prevent a death through
starvation.4

Law professors have been particularly

imaginative

in

concocting

combinations

of hypothetical

permutations

and

circumstances

that

should or should not be included in a satisfactory
law. Drafting such a law, some argue, poses a task
beyond satisfactory resolution. 5
(2) Attaching

a criminal

penalty

for the

absence of altruism might redefine such behavior and
thereby diminish the number of what once had been
regarded as purely selfless actions.6
(3) Some libertarians maintain that duty-torescue laws are "an exalted form of socialism"q and
that "it is a form of slavery to make one man serve
another."g
(4) Statutes demanding

intervention,

it is

claimed, would open up untoward opportunities for
false prosecutions.

In France, for instance, a man

who had shot another was convicted both for willful
wounding and for failure to provide aid.9 Even more
disconcerting was the conviction in the same country
under its failure-to-aid law of a surgeon who refused
to perform a caesarean operation on the dead body of
a woman eight-months pregnant, 10

---------------7

(5) Laws proscribing
need would

encourage

assistance to those in

bystanders

to interfere

officiously and ineptly in situations where they ought
to remain passively on the sidelines. 11
(6) From the viewpoint of the administration
of criminal justice, it would prove difficult to sort out
the true malefactors

if a considerable

number of

persons, such as the 38 apathetic onlookers in the
notorious Kitty Genovese case, could in some degree
be implicated. How under such circumstances should
responsibility and criminal blame be fairly assessed?
(7) The tort implications

of intervening

behavior pose dilemmas that make statutory action
questionable.

Should, for instance, a person rescued

from drowning be liable for the support of the family
of her rescuer if he drowns while saving her? Should
a doctor who fails to provide aid be liable to the
second doctor who contacts a disabling disease when
she subsequently offers assistance? 12
Besides the foregoing issues, Antony Honore
senses in the age-old Anglo-American legal position
regarding

the law's indifference

to assistance

for

those in jeopardy "a certain pride in the irrational,
incalculable depravity of the law." 13 But the most
fundamental ethical argument against criminalizing

g.--~---------------

failure-to-rescue

has

been

stated

by Herbert

Fingarette, who draws a sharp distinction between
personal morality (limy soul ") and legal demands
(Caesar's affairs) in the following terms:
...whether my soul is saved or not is
none of the state's
Caesar

regulate

business.

his own

Let
affairs:

keeping the public order and the public
well-being. My soul is ~
was Jesus' teaching;

affair. This

and it is also

central to our political tradition. 14
A contrary legal tradition, however, exists
throughout Europe.

The Russian Criminal Code of

1845 was the first declaration by a major Western
jurisdiction of criminal liability for failure to assist
those in need. It was followed by similar provisions
in the criminal

codes

of Tuscany

(1853),

the

Netherlands (1881), and Italy (1889).
The present French provision

on duty-to-

rescue nicely illustrates the ethical ambiguity that can
be associated with such statutes.

Under pressure in

1941 from the German occupation authorities, who
had killed fifty hostages as reprisal for the murder of a

-~-----------~-----9

German officer, and who wanted French citizens to
report resistance

activities,

the Vichy government

decreed punishment for two kinds of offenders: (1)
those who failed to inform on would-be-criminals,
and (2) those who failed to bring or summon aid for
one in peril, if affirmative action did not involve risk
to the rescuer or to third parties, and if the failure to
act was causally related to the death or serious harm
of the imperiled person.

The law was said to have

been unevenly

possibly

applied,

distrust of German motives.

because

of the

But its second section

was reenacted after the liberation of France. The new
statute, however, dropped the provision that required
serious bodily harm or death before criminal liability
attached to the failure to act (Laws of 1945, Penal
Code, art. 63, s. 2). Similarly, the Germans retained
their failure-to-aid law, enacted by the Nazis in 1935,
though the phrase that the statute reflected the "social
solidarity of the people" was excised.l5
The French statute often has been invoked
against physicians who do not respond to calls from
those

seeking

emergency

aid.

Andre

Tunc,

summarizing more than two decades of experience
with the law, notes that "in France, at least in my
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opinion, the law ...acts as an incentive to everybody to
behave like a Good Samaritan," though he points out
that it would be interesting to know the facts behind
the numerical

reports,

which at the time he was

writing listed about 65 convictions annually, almost
all of them involving prison terms. 16

A CASE OF FATAL FORNICATION1?
Portugal, uncharacteristically

for a European

nation, did not include a duty-to-aid provision in its
criminal law until 1982. Its statute now mirrors that
of France and Germany, though an earlier draft had
been more demanding, insisting on intervention from
anyone who was "in a position to prevent a criminal
offense without severe risk to himself, or without
omitting a duty of equal or greater importance." This
proposal was softened in the face of complaints by the
law revision commission that it was "too broad," and
"contrary to the prevailing ethical concepts of the
country."
To learn how the new law operates, and partly
in response to Tunc's call for case study material, in
1987 I sought detailed information in the fIrst half
dozen episodes that had been prosecuted. All but two
had involved traffIc matters, and primarily represented
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an early attempt to detennine how the law might mesh
with hit-and-run

statutes.

[In the United States, it

might be noted in passing, hit-and-run statutes run
roughshod over the constitutional protection against
self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment.

They do

so on the patently flimsy ground that the privilege of
driving carries with it a reciprocal duty not to leave the
scene of an accident that you have caused.Jl8
These are the details of the most notable
Portuguese
February

failure-to-aid

case to the time: On

17, 1984, in a hamlet with perhaps 100

residents, located near the city of Alcoba~a, a 65 yearold man invited to his house a 21 year-old woman
who lived nearby. The man, a retired carpenter, was
well-off by village standards. A hip operation had left
him unable to dress or undress himself.
woman was very poor, unattractive,

The young

and not very

bright.
The

incapacitated

man

and his visitor

obviously agreed to some sexual arrangement.

His

pants now off, the man suddenly became ill, and then
fainted.

The woman, according to the court report,

"was perfectly aware that his condition was serious."
She took the unconscious man's wallet, containing a
small amount of money, a postal money order, and

12--,-----------~-.......".-

his identity card. She subsequently burned the card.
On her way out of the house, the woman also stole
some food from the refrigerator. As she was walking
back to her own house, she met a person who would
later testify that she never mentioned the condition of
the victim. The victim was found by a neighbor, who
had noticed the door of his house open, and went to
investigate. The man was taken to the hospital, where
he died four days later from the brain hemorrhage he
had suffered.
The offender was identified when she tried to
pass a bill in the village's only store. It was a crudelyprinted facsimile bank note of a kind sometimes sent
to people with advertisements,

and the victim was

known to have had it in his wallet.

The court

imposed the sternest sentence for violation of the
failure-to-aid

law, though it carried a maximum of

only one year, compared to the three-year maximums
for the other offenses charged--theft, and destruction
of an official document

(the identity card).

The

composite sentence was payment of 30,000 escudos
(about $200) or 131 days in prison; payment of court
costs;

and restitution of 10,000 escudos to anyone

entitled to make a claim.
The fact situation in this Portuguese

case

resembles in some regards events surrounding the

""'----------13

death of Nelson

Rockefeller,

the former

Vice

President of the United States. Rockefeller, 70 yearsold, died of a heart attack in January 1979 while in the
company

of a young woman

in his New York

apartment. She waited for an hour before telephoning
a friend, who in turn called the police.

Since the

family refused to permit an autopsy, it never was
established
been

saved

Newpapers

whether Rockefeller's
by a more

timely

life might have
call

for help.

took what was an obviously

prurient

interest in the case, leading The Nation to pinpoint a
significant ethical ingredient of the episode: "The real
issue," The Nation insisted editorially,

"has to do

with whether public figures have a right to minimal
private lives or, in this case, to a private death."
Details of the Rockefeller

case, it was insisted,

involved a "minimalist zone of privacy." 19
Should failure-to-aid,
Portuguese

as represented by the

case and the Rockefeller

experience,

dictate that an ethical principle be translated into a
legal imperative, or should considerations of privacy
and personal choice be allowed to prevail?
victim, of course, has no opportunity
retroactive

opinion,

but

presumably

The

to record a
in

the

overwhelming number of cases, he would like to get

14

as much help in as timely a manner as possible,
despite the price his reputation may have to pay. The
to-be-offender

undoubtedly

would prefer in most

instances to protect her "good name," and might argue
that the emergency was not of her own creation, and
therefore ought not be her responsibility; or, if it is,
she ought

at least to be allowed

anonymity.

And, more basically, there must remain

some doubt about whether

to retain her

the behavior

of the

participants would have been altered by existence of a
criminal statute demanding that aid be provided.
The more relaxed moral ethos of our day
mutes somewhat one issue involved in these particular
kinds of cases; celebrity and fortune rather than shame
and humiliation seem to await the Donna Rices and
Jessica Hahns of today, if not the Gary Harts.

All

told, the chance to save a life undoubtedly should be
given precedence over the opportunity to hold private
affairs private.
BALANCING ETIllCAL AND LEGAL
CONCERNS
My field work indicated that the relatively
recent Portuguese law requiring persons to provide
aid in emergencies when they might reasonably do so
without undue danger to themselves seemed to be
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quite workable; and the evidence indicated that it has
not been used for nefarious purposes, though, as the
examples

from France indicate,

that potentiality

certainly inheres in any failure-to-aid law.
The other ethical and legal objections noted
earlier might be met by the following points:
(1) Legal analysts make their living and their
reputations

by ingeniously

locating reasons why

something won't or shouldn't work, and why what
seems reasonably

simple

is a good deal more

convoluted

than people might otherwise imagine.

European

jurisdictions

significantly

uniformly,

and

for

long periods of time, have found that

penal laws punishing

failure-to-aid

are workable

provisions.
Nobody,

Lord Macaulay

notwithstanding,

would desire to criminally fault the physician who
failed to undertake

the journey

Meerut, however unencumbered
moment.

If the same doctor

from Calcutta to
he might be at the
refused

to offer

assistance to a person bleeding to death as a result of
an automobile

accident

within sight of his front

window, because he did not want to interrupt a dinner
party, many of us might believe that he ought to have
to answer to the criminal law for such callousness.
John Kleinig has aptly noted that omissions under law
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constitute

a restricted

subclass

of nondoings.

Omissions are attached to omitters, he points out, in a
way that mere nondoings are not: we do not blame
Prince Charles or Sophia Loren or an isolated Eskimo
for the failure to rescue the victim outside the doctor's
window, but only the person who sensibly could
have rendered aid.20
(2) That imperatives imposed by the threat of
criminal prosecution

would eviscerate

the moral

grandeur of altruism, and that such statutes might
diminish the number of altruistic actions, seems farfetched and quite unlikely. Ethical actions performed
anonymously,

with no prospect of reward and no

likelihood of condemnation--actions
the biblical Good Samaritan ~

such as those of
1O:29-36)--are

devoutly to be desired, but the carrot and stick of legal
standards are precisely useful where the norms of the
society begin to fail. If nothing else, a failure-to-aid
law indicates

the kind of behavior that a society

endorses and the kind of indifference to others that it
deplores.
(3) To say that such laws do disservice to
liberty

and force

individuality
repudiate

humans

to subordinate

to the requirements

the interdependent

their

of others is to

nature of all human

existence.

As A. D. Woozley has noted: "Any new

law at all is some restriction on liberty, but not all
restrictions

are threats to it."2l

Laws demanding

responsible action in emergencies, as Kleinig notes,
are concerned with the harm that comes from "eroding
those fundamental

social relations

on which our

individual welfare ultimately depends. ,,22
(4) All laws can be abused, but there seems
no reason why a failure-to-aid

statute would be

applied malevolently and unreasonably any more than
any other statute is so used.

That Al Capone was

handed a draconian sentence on an income tax evasion
charge because the government was unable to nail him
for his more barbaric acts is hardly an argument
against the imposition of criminal penalties for tax
fraud: it only warns that power can and will be
abused, and that it is necessary to monitor the use of
power as best as possible
minimized.

so that such abuse is

(5) That a failure-to-aid

statute will tum us

into a nation of inept meddlers and vicious vigilantes
also appears to represent more of a sophistical point
than a realistic assessment of the impact of a law that
seems at most likely to have a marginal (though
important) impact on the way people behave, and a

strong impact on the way that the social system
presents itself, setting out those things for which it
stands.
(6) Sorting out malefactors is a task that the
criminal justice system routinely undertakes, and there
is no reason to anticipate that it would have much
difficulty in doing the same under a failure-to-aid law.
Take the Genovese case, for example.

The crime

took place in Kew Gardens, on the outskirts of New
York City, at about 3 o'clock in the morning on
March 13, 1964. Ms. Genovese was knifed in the
back as she tried to run from her automobile to the
shelter of a nearby apartment building entryway. She
screamed

:"Help me! Help me! Oh, God, he's

stabbed me."

A neighbor leaned from his window

and yelled: "Let that girl alone!" The assailant turned
and ran from the scene.
Kitty Genovese then staggered about thirty
yards, seeking sanctuary inside one of the nearby
doors.

Ten minutes passed before her assailant

returned

to the site and began to hunt down his

victim.

When he finally located Ms. Genovese, he

slashed her brutally with his knife, then raped her.
Of the 38 persons later located who admitted
having heard her cries for help, the most culpable
clearly was a male friend of the victim who apparently
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had stood at the top of the stairs and had seen her
killed,

without

doing

a thing.

He thereafter

telephoned friends asking their advice, and finally
walked across the building rooftop so that he could
use another person's telephone

to call the police,

because he wanted to avoid being identified
involved.

and

The murderer, when later apprehended,

was asked how he had dared to return to the scene
after fleeing it: "I knew they wouldn't do anything,"
he said. "People never do. ,,23
From a prosecutor's viewpoint, it would seem
reasonable to go after the most egregious violators,
especially since an especially strong element of the
law being invoked

is its character

as an ethical

statement.
(7) Finally, as with the criminal law, courts
and juries have sufficient experience and wit to sort
out the tort implications

of diverse scenarios that

could be involved in passage of a duty-to-aid law.
There may be transient difficulties and tinkering with
details may be required, but the issue hardly seems so
insurmountable that it ought to scuttle what otherwise
would be a desirable translation of an ethical matter
into a legal statement.
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CONCLUSION
Whatever its roots--whether they are planted
in the soil of capitalism or the individualist ethos of
the frontier--it seems that the indifference of American
criminal law to failure-to-aid represents an outdated
doctrine. That the law has not been altered so that it
conforms more closely with ethical dictates probably
is a consequence of inertia as much or more than any
deeply-held

ideological

jurisprudents

values.

Some feminist

now insist that the no-duty-to-aid

position represents

a quintessential

masculine

that is "devoid

attitude

responsiveness

to the

safety

example of a
of care and

of others,"

and

unresponsive

to "other's needs and hurts. ,,24 Like

many

chauvinistic

other

doctrines

built

upon

toughness and self-reliance, they regard this one as
anachronistic.
From the evidence available,
appear

to be overriding

enactment of failure-to-aid

practical

there do not
objections

to

criminal provisions in

Anglo-American law. Nonetheless, it is obvious that
the drafters and the enforcers would need to exercise
due care to make certain that such laws produce as
much good as possible, with a minimum diminution
of an individual's right to protect himself or herself
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from a criminal label when the omission occurred for
decent, or at least arguably decent reasons.
Foster's

rule-of-thumb

guideline:
indifference

seems

"only egregious

an

Henry

appropriate

examples

of wanton

should be subject to the law's clumsy

sanctions. ,,25 All matters considered, there seems
little doubt that failure-to-aid laws make reasonable
ethical demands upon what, in the evocative French
phrase, constitutes "egoisme excessif."

22------

---------

NOTES
1. Peter R. Glazebrook. "Criminal omissions: the
duty requirements in offenses against the person,"
Law OUarterlyReview, 76 (1980): 386.
2. Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co., 44 At!. 809
( .H., 1898)
3. Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904 (N.Y.,
1935).
4. Richard Epstein. "A theory of strict liability,"
Journal of Le~al Studies, 2 (1973): 198-199.
5. See in particular Wallace M. Rudolph, "The duty
to act: a proposed rule," Nebraska Law Journal, 44
(1965): 499-537.
6. William M. Landes and Richard A Posner.
"Salvors, finders, Good Samaritans, and other
rescuers: An economic study of law and altruism,"
Journal of Le~al Studies, 7 (1978): 83-128.
7. H.D. Minor. "The moral obligation as a basis of
responsibility, " Yir~inia Law Review, 9 (1933): 422.
8. Note. "Failure to rescue: A comparative study,"
Columbia Law Review, 52 (1952): 641.
9. Jean Larguier. "French penal law and the duty to
aid persons in danger," Tulane Law Review, 38
(1963): 89.
10. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "Good and bad Samaritans:
A comparative study of criminal law provisions
concerning failure to rescue," Amercian Journal of
Comparative Law, 14 (1965-66): 646.

-------,-----23

11. W.H. Hitchler, "Crimes and civil injuries,"
Dickenson Law Reyiew, 39 (1934): 23-36.
12.
See Charles O. Gregory,
"Gratuitous
undertakings and the duty of care," DePaul Law
Review,
1 (1951): 30-68; Allen M. Linden,
"Rescuers and good Samaritans," Modern Law
Review,
34 (1971): 241-259; Note, "The bad
Samaritan: Rescue reexamined," Geor~etown Law
Journal, 54 (1966): 629-643.
13. Antony M. Honore, "Laws, morals, and rescue."
In James M. Ratcliffe, ed., The Good Samaritan and
the Bad (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966):
241.
14. Herbert Fingarette, "Some moral aspects of
Good Samaritanism."
In James M. Ratcliffe, ed.,
The Good Samaritan and the Law (Garden City, NY:
Anchor Books, 1966): 218.
15.
H. Gallas, "Zur revision des
Juristenzeitun~, 16 (1952): 396-397.

s. 330c,"

16. Andre Tunc, "The volunteer and the Good
Samaritan." In James M. Ratcliffe, ed., The Good
Samaritan and The Law (Garden City, NY: Anchor
Books, 1966): 43-62.
17. I am deeply obligated to Maria Rosa Almeida,
tecnica superior
do Gabinete
de Estudos e
Planeamento, Ministerio do Justica, Lisbon, for her
help with my work in Portugal, and to my son-inlaw, Adrian Fernandes, for translating during our
interviews with people involved in the case described
in the text.

24

18. See, for example, People v. Graham, 118 P.2d
256 (California, 1941).
19. Editorial.
(1979):161.

"Last rights,"

The

Nation,

228

20. John Kleinig, "Criminal liability for failures to
act," Law and Contemporary Problems, 49 (1986):
169.
21 AD. Woozley, "A duty to rescue: thoughts on
criminal liability," Yir~nia Law Reyiew, 69 (1983):
130.
22. John Kleinig, "Good Samaritanism," Philosophy
and Public Affairs. 5 (1976): 399.
23. AM. Rosenthal, Thirty-ei~ht Witnesses (New
York: McGraw-HIll, 1964); Albert A Seedman and
Peter Hellman, Chief! (New York: Arthur Fields,
1974).
24. Leslie Binder, "A lawyer's primer on feminist
theory and tort," Journal of Le~al Education. 38
(1988): 34.
25. Henry H. Foster, Jr. Book review of Ratcliffe,
Good Samaritan and the Law, in Notre Dame L
~,
42 (1967): 589.

----,--------~-25

Biography
Gilbert Geis is Professor Emeritus, Program
in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine.
He has been
University
Harvard

a visiting

professor

at Sydney

Law School, and a visiting fellow at
Law

Criminology

School

and

at Cambridge

the

Institute

Univeristy.

of

He has

received research awards form the American Society
of Criminology

(Sutherland

Award,

1985); the

American Justice Institute (McGee Award, 1989);
the Western Society of Criminology (fappan Award,
1980); and the National Organization

for Victim

Assistance (Schafer Award, 1980). He has written a
dozen books and many articles on various aspects of
criminal justice.
Professor

Geis was a Visiting Scholar of

Western Michigan University in October of 1987
under the sponsorship

of the Criminal

Program.

26------

--------

Justice

CENTER PUBLICATIONS
VOLUME I
No.1, October, 1987
Ethical Norms in Science
Rachelle D. Hollander
National Science Foundation
No.2, January, 1988
Ethics in Academia
Diether H. Haenicke
Western Michigan University
No.3, May, 1988
Thoughts on Keeping My Mouth Shut
David H. Smith
Poynter Center
Indiana University
No.4,June,1988
Affirmative Action Defended
Laurence Thomas
Oberlin College
VOLUMEII
o. 1, November, 1988
Biomedical Ethics in the Soviet Union
Richard DeGeorge
University of Kansas
No.2, January, 1989
Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as Much as
Doctors and Lawyers?
James W. Nickel
University of Colorado
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No.3, February, 1989
Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care: Is Society Sending
a Mixed Message?
John V. Hartline, M.D.
Neonatology, Kalamazoo Michigan
No.4, March, 1989
Codes of Ethics in Business
Michael Davis
lllinois Institute of Technology
No.5, May, 1989
Should I (Legally) Be My Brother's Keeper?
Gilbert Geis
Univ. of Cal., Irvine

WINTER

1989

PRESENTATIONS

Jan.

20

Lucille Taylor, Majority Council,
Michigan State Senate, and Paul
Denenfeld,
Legal Director, Am.
Civil Liberties Union-MI.
2:00 p.m., Faculty Lounge, Bernhard
Center
"Surrogate Motherhood: The
Michigan Legislation"

Jan.

23

Richard Gull, Philosophy,
University of Michigan, Flint
7:30 p.m., Red Rooms, Bernhard
Center
"What Will Work Be Like After The
Elimination of Work"

Feb.

20

Ferdinand
Schoeman,
Philosophy,
University of South
Carolina
7:30 p.m., 1010 Fetzer Center
"Privacy and Group Process"

Feb.

21

Ferdinand
Schoeman
4:00 p.m., 3020 Friedmann Hall
"Cognitive Limits and Moral
Heuristics: A Critique of Moral
Theories" Department of Philosophy
Colloquy
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Feb.24

David Jones, Plainwell School
District, Judy Johnson, Kalamazoo
School District, and Patrick
Jenlink, Educational Leadership,
WMU
3:00 p.m., International Room, 205
Bernhard Center
Panel in "Ethical Dilemmas in
Educational Administration"

Mar. 1

Milton Fisk, Philosophy,
University of Indiana
7:30 p.m., 2750 Knauss Hall
"Marxism and Justice"

Apr.7

Joseph
Tolliver,
Philosophy,
University of Arizona
3:00 p.m., Faculty Lounge, Bernhard
Center
"Making Babies: Parental Rights and
Responsibilities
in The Age of
Reproductive Technology"

SPRING

1989 PRESENTATIONS

May 3

Benedict Paparella, Philosophy,
Villanova University
7:30 p.m., 105 Bernhard Center
"A Code of Ethics for Multi-National
Corporations"

May 11

Faith Gabelnick, Honors College
Dean, WMU. Gene Grochowski,
M.D., Nephrology and Hypertension,
Kalamazoo. Lori Holmes, Director
of Family Services, Kalamazoo.
Marie Hungerman, Philosophy,
Nazareth College. James Jaksa,
Communications, WMU.
3:00-5:00 p.m., 215-216 Bernhard
Center.
Panel on: "Habits of The Heart: Ethical
Implications"

May 17

Heinz Luegenbiehl, Philosophy,
Division of Humanities, Social and
Life Sciences, Rose-Human Institute
of Technology, Terre Haute, Indiana
3:p.m., Faculty Lounge, Bernhard
Center.
"Moral Courage and the Engineer"
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May 24

Justin Schwartz, Degree in
Philosophy and Political Science,
Kalamazoo College.
3:00 p.m., Faculty Lounge, Bernhard
Center.
"Philosophy, Politics and Nuclear
War"

June 23

Ronald Arnett, Dean, Manchester
College. Clifford Christians,
Communication Research Center,
University of Illinois (Urbana).
Richard Johannesen, Chair,
Department of Communication
Studies, Northern lllinois University.
Lea Stewart, Chair, Department of
Communication, Rutgers University.
3:00 p.m., Faculty Lounge, Bernhard
Center.
Panel on: "Issues in Communication
Ethics"

MEMBERSHIP
Membership in the Ethics Center is open to anyone
interested. There is no membership fee.

======================================
Please enroll me as a member of the WMU Center
for the Study of Ethics in Society.
Name __________________________________
Mailing

Address ______________

Institutional

Affiliation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

======================================
Send to: Center for the Study of Ethics in Society
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Ml 49008
The Center publishes papers of interest to its
readers. Distribution is free to members.
Additional copies may be obtained for $2.00 by
writing to the Center.
Lithograph on Front Cover:
Michigan University

The Oaklands, Western
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